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COMMERCIAL
PAPER CONVERSION
A
COLLECTING BANK MAY LIMIT ITS LIABILITY FOR
CONVERSION WHEN IT PAYS A PAYABLE THROUGH
DRAFT CONTAINING A MISSING INDORSEMENT
PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION 4-207(4) OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
On May 20, 1982, Great American Insurance Companies
(Great American) issued a "payable through draft" 1 to Welch
Rathole Service (Welch) and Ford Motor Credit Company (Ford
Credit) in settlement of an insurance claim. 2 Great American
delivered the draft to Welch. 3 Welch indorsed and deposited the
draft in its account at American State Bank without the
indorsement of Ford Credit. 4 On May 27, 1982, American State
Bank indorsed the draft and credited Welch's account for the
amount of the draft.5 American State Bank then forwarded the
draft through banking channels to Great American. 6 On June 3,
1982, an employee of Great American reviewed and initialed the
draft in accordance with its procedures for paying payable through
drafts. 7 In December 1982, Great American was informed that
Ford Credit had not been paid. 8 On March 30, 1983, Great
1.See U.C.C. 5 3-120 (1.978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-03-20 (1983)1. The Uniform Commercial
Code defines a payable through draft as follows: "An instrument which states that it is 'payable
through' a bank or the like designates that bank as a collecting bank to make presentment but does
not of itself authorize the bank to pay the instrument." Id.
2. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. American State Bank, 385 N.W.2d 460, 461 (N.D. 1986). Great
American insured a truck owned by Welch and financed by Ford Credit. Id. The truck was involved
in an accident and the insurance policy listed Welch and Ford Credit as loss payees for claims on the
truck. Id.
3. Id. Great American issued a "payable through" draft to the order of Welch and Ford Credit
in the amount of $13,000. Id. Ford Credit's interest in the draft was $9,712.08 and Welch's interest
was $3,287.92. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. American State Bank forwarded the draft to Great American's bank, Provident. Id.
Provident then presented the draft to Great American for payment. Id.
7. Id. Both American State Bank and Great American failed to recognize that Ford Credit's
indorsement was missing. Id.
8. Id. Great American took possession of the truck and sold it for salvage to George Franchuk.
Id. Mr. Franchuk subsequently informed Great American that Ford Credit would not release its lien
on the truck because it had not been paid. Id.
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American paid Ford Credit $9,712.08 for a release and assignment
of all of Ford Credit's interest and rights in the May 20th draft. 9
Great American then commenced an action against American
State Bank alleging that the bank had converted the May 20th
draft. 10 The district court granted judgment against American
State Bank. 1 On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court,
American State Bank contended that its liability for conversion
should be limited by subsection 4-207(4) of the Uniform
Commerical Code. 12 Subsection 4-207(4) provides that, unless the
claim is made within a reasonable time, liability will be discharged
on the presentment warranties to the extent of any loss caused by a
person's delay in asserting a claim for breach of presentment
warranties. ' 3 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that, although
Great American, as Ford Credit's assignee, brought an action for
conversion and not one for breach of presentment warranties,
assignment did not preclude American State from asserting that its
9. Id.

10. Id. In addition to its conversion claim Great American brought a claim for breach of
presentment warranties pursuant to 5 4-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 461-62; see
U.C.C. S4-207(l) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CoDE S 41-04-17(1) (1983)]. Section 4-207(1) provides:
Each Customer or collecting bank who obtains payment or acceptance of an item
and each prior customer and collecting bank warrants to the payor bank or other
payor who in good faith pays or accepts the item that
(a)
he has a good title to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or
acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title; and
(b)
he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is
unauthorized, except that this warranty is not given by any customer or
collecting bank that is a holder in due course and acts in good faith
(i)
to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
(ii)
to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature, whether
or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii)
to an acceptor of an item if the holder in due course took the item
after the acceptance without knowledge that the drawer's
signature was unauthorized; and
(c)
the item has not been materially altered, except that this warranty is not
given by any customer or collecting bank that is a holder in due course
and acts in good faith
(i)
to the maker of a note; or
(ii)
to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer is also the
drawee; or
(iii)
to the acceptor of an item with respect to an alteration made
prior to the acceptance if the holder in due course took the item
after the acceptance, even though the acceptance provided
"payable as originally drawn" or equivalent terms; or
(iv)
to the acceptor ofan item with respect to an alteration made after
the acceptance.
Id. Great American subsequently moved to dismiss its breach of warranty action before trial. Great
American, 385 N.W. 2d at 462.
11. Great American, 385 N.W.2d at 462.

12. Id.; seeU.C.C. S 4-207(4) (1978) [N.D. Cent. Code 5 41-04-17(4) (1983)]. Subsection 4207(4) provides: "Unless a claim for breach of warranty under this section is made within a
reasonable time after the person claiming learns of the breach, the persn liable is discharged to the
extent of any loss caused by the delay in making claim." Id.
13. U.C.C. § 4-207(4) (1978) [N.D. CENT. Cosr S41-04- 17(4) (1983)].
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liability was limited pursuant to subsection 4-207(4) of the.Uniform
Commercial Code. 14 Furthermore, the court held that for the
purposes of a payable through draft with missing indorsements, the
party claiming a breach of presentment warranties "learns of the
breach" within the meaning of subsection 4-207(4) when it
approves the draft for payment. 15 Great American Ins. v. American
State Bank, 385 N.W.2d 460 (N.D. 1986).
Subsection 3-419(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code
provides three instances in which a negotiable instrument can be
converted. 16 Specifically, subsection 3-419(1)(c) provides that "an
instrument is converted when . . . it is paid on a forged
indorsement." 1 7 However, courts have not interpreted subsection
3-419(1) to be an exclusive statement of what actions constitute
conversion. 18
In Humberto Decorators, Inc. v. Plaza National Bank 19 a payee of a
cashier's check sued a collecting bank for conversion when the
collecting bank paid the check without the indorsement of the
payee. 20 The court in Humberto stated that, although subsection 3419(1) does not specifically provide that payment over a missing
indorsement constitutes conversion, courts are free to supplement
the Code with general principles of common law. 2 1 Therefore,
14. GreatrAmerican, 385 N.W.2d at 462, 466.
15. Id. at 462; see U.C.C. § 4-207(4) (1978). For the text of 5 4-207(4), see supra note 12.
16. See U.C.C. 5 3-419(1) (1979) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-03-56(1) (1983)]. Subsection 3-419 (1)
provides: "An instrument is converted when (a) a drawee to whom it is delivered for acceptance
refuses to return it on demand; or (b) any person to whom it is delivered for payment refuses on
demand either to pay or return it; or (c) it is paid on a forged indorsement." Id.
1I.Seeid. S 3-419(1)(c).
18. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. University Nat'l Bank, 590 F.2d 849, 851-52 (10th Cir.
1979). In Commercial Credit Corp. the drawer of a draft brought a conversion action against a collecting
bank. Id. at 850. The drawer claimed that the bank had converted the draft when it negotiated the
draft to a third party after the drawer had stopped payment on the draft. Id. at 851. In its
determination that the three types of conversion listed in S 3-419 were not exclusive, the court stated
that a person converts a negotiable instrument when he or she unlawfully takes, detains, or refuses to
surrender a negotiable instrument belonging to another. Id. at 852; seeU.C.C. S 3-419(1) (1978)
[N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-03-56(1) (1983)] (conversion of instrument). For the text of § 3-419(1), see
supra note 16. The court's definition of conversion is analogous to the traditional definition of
common-law conversion, which is the wrongful exercise of control over another's personal property.
See Commercial Credit Corp., 590 F.2d at 852; see also In re Quantum Dev. Corp., 397 F. Supp. 329, 337
(D.V.I. 1975) (Code's list of acts that constitute conversion is not exclusive and the general
principles of law relating to the conversion of property remain in force), aff'd, 534 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hepler State Bank, 6 Kan. App. 2d
543,
-, 630 P.2d 721, 725 (1981) (the three listed types of conversion in S 3-419 are not intended
to be exclusive); Continental Cas. Co. v. Huron Valley Nat'l Bank, 271 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Mich.
1978) (in forged indorsement cases, conversion has been defined as the wrongful act of dominion
over another's property).
19. 180 N.J. Super. 170, 434 A.2d 618 (1981).
20. Humberto Decorators, Inc. v. Plaza Nat'l Bank, 180 N.J. Super. 170,..., 434 A.2d 618,
618-19 (1981). Despite the fact that the payee only alleged negligence on the part of the collecting
434 A.2d
bank, the court determined that the collecting bank was liable for conversion. Id. at -,
at 618-19.
21. Id. at -,
434 A.2d at 619; seeU.C.C. S 1-103 (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-01-03
(1983)]. Section 1-103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
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because the court perceived no legal difference between payment of
an instrument on a forged indorsement and payment on no
indorsement, the bank was liable for conversion of the cashier's
check. 22 The Humberto decision is just one example of broad judicial
interpretation of subsection 3-419(1) of the Uniform Commercial
23
Code.
Subsection 3-419(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code,
however, provides a collecting bank with a defense to an alleged
conversion action involving negotiable instruments. 24 Subsection 3419(3) provides that as long as a bank acts in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable commercial standards, it will be liable
for conversion to the owner of the instrument only to the extent that
any of the proceeds are still in its possession. 25 Because of the
variety of circumstances that may arise, courts have defined
'reasonable commercial standards" in several different ways. 26
In Knesz v. CentralJersey Bank & Trust 27 a payee of two drafts
sued a depositary bank for conversion after the bank paid the drafts
containing forged indorsements of the payee. 28 An attorney of the
payee sold some of the payee's property and received the drafts,
drawn to the order of the payee, in exchange for the property. 29
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or
other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." Id.
22. Humberto, 180 N.J. Super. at__ , 434 A.2d at 619.
23. See id. at __, 434 A.2d at 619; see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hepler State Bank, 6
Kan. App. 2d 543, __,
630 P.2d 721, 725 (1981) (although the Uniform Commercial Code fails to
expressly include unauthorized indorsements other than forgeries in S 3-419, courts may define
conversion from the Code and by general principles of common law).
24. See U.C.C.S 3-419(3) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-03-56(3) (1983)]. Subsection 3-419(3)
provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive indorsements, a
representative, including a depositary or collecting bank who has in good faith and in
accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of
such representative dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was
not the true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond the
amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands.

Id.
25. Id. For the text of S 3-419(3), see supra note 24.
26. See, e.g., Tubin v. Rabin, 389 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (payment of cashier's
check containing missing indorsement of copayee was not in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards), aff'd, 533 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1976); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Nat'l Bank,
431 F.2d 341 F.2d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 1970) (banks do not, as a matter of reasonable commercial
practice, deal with instruments lacking the necessary indorsements); Barnett Bank v. Lipp, 364 So.
2d 28, 30 (1978) (blind reliance on the indorsement does not constitute action in accordance with the
reasonable commercial standards of the industry).
27.97 N.J. 1,477 A.2d 806 (1984).
28. Knesz v. CentralJersey Bank & Trust, 97 N.J. 1, -, 477 A.2d 806, 807-08 (1984).
29. Id. at __, 477 A.2d at 807. Knesz, the payee of two drafts, hired an attorney to maintain
and collect the rent from an apartment he owned. Id. at __,
477 A.2d at 807. The attorney,
Moringeillo, sold the apartment and received a number of drafts in exchange for payment. Id. at
.,477 A.2d at 807.
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The attorney subsequently forged the payee's indorsement on the
drafts and negotiated them to a customer of the depositary bank.30
The customer then indorsed the drafts and deposited them into his
account at the depositary bank. 3 1 The depositary bank accepted
32
and paid the drafts.
The court in Knesz determined that the depositary bank acted
in a commercially reasonable manner in paying the drafts because
it did not deal with the forger, but with the bank's customer. 33 In
addition,the restrictive indorsement was properly utilized and
indorsed, and none of the indorsements were in any way irregular
on their face. 34 Therefore, the court concluded that the depositary
bank was entitled to a defense pursuant to subsection 3-419(3) and
35
was not liable for conversion.
In addition to a bank's "reasonable commercial standards"
defense, the drawer of a check may be precluded from shifting the
loss to collecting banks when the drawer is negligent pursuant to
subsection 4-406(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code. 36
Subsection 4-406(1) requires a bank customer to inspect his or her
bank statement and checks and to promptly notify the drawee bank
of any unauthorized signatures or alterations. 37 Section 4-406 does
not on its face impose a duty on the drawer to exercise reasonable
30. Id. at-_, 477 A.2d at 807.
31. Id. at-__, 477 A.2d at 807.
32. Id. at -_, 477 A.2d at 807.
33. Id. at -,
477 A.2d at 809. The court stated that the depositary bank acted in a
commercially reasonable manner when it accepted the drafts from the attorney, who was one of the
bank's regular customers, even though the drafts contained forged indorsements. Id. at __,
477
A.2d at 809. The drafts appeared as if they were properly indorsed by both the attorney and the law
firm in which he wt. ked. Id. at -_, 477 A.2d at 809. The court stated there were no irregularities
in the drafts that were sufficient to raise any suspicion on the part of the bank. Id. at -, 477 A.2d
at 810.
34. Id. at -,
477 A.2d at 809. The court determined that the indorsements indicated a
proper chain of title because the forged drafts contained all the necessary indorsements. Id. at __,
477 A.2d at 809.
35. Id. at
-_, 477 A.2d at 810; see U.C.C. S 3- 419(3)(1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-03- 56(3)
(1965)]. For the text of S 3-419(3), see supra note 24. Generally, courts have noted that, whether the
collecting bank acted in a commercially reasonable m~nner in order to shift liability for the loss, is a
question of fact to be decided by the jury. See Casarez v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 508,
-_, 660 P.2d 598,
603 (Ct. App. 1983) (whether the bank acted in accordance with reasonable commercial standards in
failing to check the validity of the indorsements presented a factual issue to be decided by the jury).
36. See U.C.C. S 4-406(1) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-04-33(1) (1983)]. Subsection 4-406(l)
provides:
'When a bank sends to its customer a statement of account accompanied by items
paid in good faith in support of the debit entries or holds the statement and items
pursuant to a request for instructions of its customer or otherwise in a reasonable
manner makes the statement and items available to the customer, the customer must
exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine the statement and items to
discover his unauthorized signature or any alteration on an item and must notify the
bank promptly after discovery thereof.

37. Id.
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care in reporting a forged indorsement. 38 However, subsection 4406(4) implies a duty of care by imposing a three year statute of
limitations after which the drawer will be precluded from shifting
the liability for a forged indorsement onto the drawee.3 9
If the drawer or drawee cannot be determined to be negligent
in accordance with section 4-406 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the collecting bank may be able to preclude the drawee or
depositary bank from shifting the loss onto the collecting bank
pursuant to section 4-207 of the Code.4 0 Section 4-207 defines the
. 38. See id. See generally B. CLARK, THE. LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS, AND CREDIT
6-78 (Rev. ed. 1981) (drawer not in a good position to recognize items with forged
indorsements that, unlike the drawer's forged signature or material alteration, will reconcile with his
records at the end of the month). But cf U.C.C. § 4-406 official comment 6 (1978) (nothing in this
section is intended to affect any decision holding that a customer who.has notice of something wrong
with an indorsement must exercise reasonable care to investigate and notify the bank).
39. U.C.C. 5 4-406(4) (1978) [N.D. Cent. Code § 41-04-33(4) (1983)]. Subsection 4-406(4)
provides:
CARDS,

Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or the bank a
customer who does not within one year from the time the statement and items are
made available to the customer (subsection 1) discover and report his unauthorized
signature or any alteration on the face or the back of the item or does not within three
years from that time discover and report any unauthorized indorsement is precluded
from asserting against the bank such unauthorized signature or indorsement or such
alteration.
Id. Moreover, § 4-406(5) precludes the payor bank from asserting a claim against the collecting bank
under certain circumstances. See id. S 4-406(5) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-04-33(5) (1983)]. Subsection
4-406(5) provides in relevant part:
If under this section a payor bank has a valid defense against a claim of a
customer upon or resulting from payment of an item and waives or fails upon request
to assert the defense the bank may not assert against any collecting bank or other prior
party presenting or transferring the item a claim based upon the unauthorized
signature or alteration giving rise to the customer's claim.

Id.; see also Abraham v. Moore & Schley, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 1023 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (by alleging
tardiness on the part of the drawer in discovering the forgery, the depositary bank set up a possible
defense pursuant to § 4-406(5) of the Uniform Commercial Code and avoided summary judgment
against itself). However, courts have interpreted § 4-406(5) to apply only to the defenses created in 5
4-406 and not to defenses found in other provisions of the Code. See, e.g., Girard Bank v. Mount
Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225, 1240 (D.N.J. 1979) (5 4-406(5) refers to the defenses created
by S 4-406 and not to the defense based on a customer's negligent drawing of a check created by 5 3406); accordMenthor v. Swiss Bank Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
40. See U.C.C. S 4-207 (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-04-17 (1983)]. Section 4-207 outlines the
warranties that a customer or collecting bank makes during the transfer or presentment of items. Id.
In addition, S 4-207 states the time period in which a warranty action must be commenced. Id. For
the text of S 4-207(1), (4), see supra notes 10, 12. Subsections 4-207(2), (3) provide:
(2) Each customer and collecting bank who transfers an item and receives a
settlement or other consideration for it warrants to his transferee and to any
subsequent collecting bank who takes the item in good faith that
(a)
he has a good title to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or
acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title and the transfer is
otherwise rightful; and
(b)
all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(c)
the item has not been materially altered; and
(d)
no defense of any party is good against him; and
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warranties that customers and banks make in the transfer or
presentment of items. 4 1 Pursuant to subsection 4-207(1) a collecting
bank warrants to the payor bank that the collecting bank has good
title; that it has no knowledge of an unauthorized signature; and
that the item has not been materially altered.4 2 Furthermore, courts
have stated that the warranty of good title in subsection 4-207(1)
extends only to the genuineness of all the necessary indorsements. 43
When an initial collecting bank receives a check with a forged
indorisement and obtains payment from a subsequent collecting
bank in the collection chain or the drawee bank, the initial
collecting bank breaches its warranty of good title to the subsequent
collecting bank and the drawee bank.4 4 Consequently, any bank
that appears later in the collection chain will recover the payment
from the initial collecting bank and the initial collecting bank may
then seek to recover from the forger.4 5 If recovery from the forger is
46
not possible, then the initial collecting bank must bear the loss.
(e)

he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding instituted with
respect to the maker or acceptor or the drawer of an unaccepted item.
In addition each customer and collecting bank so transferring an item and receiving a
settlement or other consideration engages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice
of dishonor and protest he will take up the item.
(3) The warranties and the engagement to honor set forth in the two preceding
subsections arise notwithstanding the absence of indorsement or words of guaranty or
warranty in the transfer or presentment and a collecting bank remains liable for their
breach despite remittance to its transferor. Damages for breach of such warranties or
engagement to honor shall not exceed the consideration received by the customer or
collecting bank responsible plus finance charges and expenses related to the item, if
any.
Id.
41. Id. 5 4-207(2), (3).
42. See id. S 4-207(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-04-17(1) (1983)] (warranties of customer or
collecting bank in transfer or presentment of items). For the text of S 4-207(1), see supra note 10.
43. See, e.g., Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 329 (1978). In Sun 'n Sand an employee of Sun 'n Sand deposited company checks into her
personal account after altering the checks and forging the indorsement of the employer. Id. at 679,
582 P.2d at 926, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 335. The employer sued the depositary bank on the theory that
the bank had breached its warranty of good title. Id. at 685, 582 P.2d at 929, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
After determining that the term "good title" referred only to the validity of all the necessary
indorsements, the court stated that this limitation of the scope of the warranty of good title was
derived from the official comments to be Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, and the structure of the Code provisions distributing losses caused by forgeries. Id.
at 685-86, 582 P.2d at 930, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 339; see also Federal Ins. Co. v. Groveland State Bank,
37 N.Y.2d 252, 261, 372 N.Y.S.2d 18, 23-24, 333 N.E.2d 334, 338 (1975) (warranty of good title
intended to permit drawee to recover from the party presenting an instrument that has a forged
indorsement); Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Hampton State Bank, 497 S.W.2d 80, 84-85 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973) (warranty of title is nothing more than an assurance that no one has better title to the
check than the warrantor).
44. See U.C.C. S 4-207(1) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-04-17(1) (1983)] (warranties of
customer or collecting bank in the transfer or presentment of items); see also 7 R. ANDERSON,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, S 4-207:15, at 40 (3d ed. 1985) (collecting bank that obtains payment
from drawee bank on check containing forged indorsement is liable to drawee bank for breach of
warranty of good title).
45. 7 R. ANDERSON, supra note 44, at 40. Anderson notes that the Uniform Commercial Code
contemplates that the drawee bank will recover the payment from the collecting bank on the theory
that the collecting bank breached its warranty of good title. Id.
46. See Stapelton v. First Sec. Bank, 675 P.2d 83 (Mont. 1983). In Stapelton a husband forged
the indorsement of his wife on two checks that were payable to them as copayees and deposited the
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In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Marine National Bankl 7 a
bankruptcy trustee for one of two joint payees sued a depositary
bank and two collecting banks for conversion when the banks paid
a joint payee draft over the missing indorsement of one of the joint
payees. 4 ' One of the collecting banks, which took the draft from the
depositary bank and was second in the collection chain, moved for
dismissal based on the warranty provisions of section 4-207. 49 The
court granted the motion after determining that the first bank that
takes the item for collection or deposit is primarily responsible for
50
checking the indorsements to make sure that they are proper.
Moreover, the court noted that the policy behind the Uniform
Commercial Code warranty provisions is to speed up the collection
process and to remove the burden from every bank in the collection
chain to meticulously check the indorsements of each item
transferred. 5 1 Consequently, the court stated that, in order to
satisfy its presentment warranty obligations, the first bank taking :
an item for collection is primarily responsible for obtaining the
52
necessary indorsements.
A collecting bank's liability for breach of presentment
warranties pursuant to subsection 4-207(1) of the Uniform
Commercial Code may also be limited by the express provisions of
checks into his personal account. Id. at 85. The wife sued the depositary-collecting bank for breach of
the Code warranty provisions. Id. at 86; see U.C.C. S 4-207 (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-04-17
(1983)]. After summarizing a collecting bank's warranty liability under Montana state law, the court
stated that the objective of the Uniform Commercial Code is to place the loss on the wrongdoer or,
because the wrongdoer is usually unavailable or unable to pay, upon the party who last dealt with the
wrongdoer. Stapelton, 675 P.2d at 86. The court reasoned that this party is best able to prevent the
conversion by carefully checking indorsements when the forger presents the check. Id.; see also Bank
of the West v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wash. App. 238, 241-42, 548 P.2d 563, 566 (1976) (if recovery
from the forger is precluded by the forger's unavailability or insolvency, the party dealing with the
forger must bear the loss).
47. 303 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970).
48. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 303 F. Supp. 401, 402 (M.D. Fla. 1969),
aff'd, 431 F.2d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1970). In FederalDeposit a debtor's surety issued a joint payee draft
to two creditors, Southern Steel and Central National Bank, in payment of the debtor's obligation to
them. 303 F. Supp. at 402. Central deposited the draft into its account at Marine National Bank
without the indorsement of Southern Steel. Id. Marine National Bank, without noticing the missing
indorsement, accepted and forwarded the draft to the drawee bank, Atlantic, who also accepted the
draft containing a missing indorsement. Id.
49. Federal Deposit, 303 F. Supp. at 402. Atlantic Bank filed a motion to dismiss the trustee's
claim against it based on the warranty of good title provisions of 4-207(2). Id.; see U.C.C. S4-207(2)
(1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-04-17(2) (1983)]. For the text of 4-207(2), see supra note 40.
50. Federal Deposit, 303 F. Supp. at 403. The court stated it placed the burden to check for the
necessary indorsements on the first bank that accepted the draft, because the first bank is in a better
position to insure that the transferor has good title than are subsequent banks in the collection chain.
Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court in Federal Deposit stated that if the rationale of the warranty provisions is to
facilitate the speedy transfer and collection of items, banks who subsequently take an item from a
depositary bank are not negligent if they do not thoroughly inspect each item for missing
indorsements. Id.
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subsection 4-207(4).51 Subsection 4-207(4) provides that a person
must make a claim for a breach of warranty within a reasonable
time after learning of the breach or the party liable will be
discharged to the extent of any loss resulting from that person's
delay. 54 However, courts have varied in their determination of
what constitutes a reasonable period of time for a person to "learn
55
of the breach" of presentment warranties.
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the issue of what
constitutes a reasonable time for a party claiming breach of
presentment warranties to learn of a missing indorsement on a
payable through draft in Great American Insurance Co. v. American State
Bank. 56 Before reaching this issue, however, the court first
considered whether subsection 3-419(1) of the Uniform
Commercial Code displaced common-law conversion in North
Dakota.5 7 Great American contended that American State Bank
had converted a payable through draft when the bank paid the draft
without a copayee's indorsement. 58 American State Bank argued
that its failure to obtain a copayee's indorsement did not constitute
conversion because section 3-419 referred only to a forged
indorsement in defining conversion. 59 However, Great American
contended that a collecting bank which pays a draft without the
indorsement of a joint payee is liable for conversion under the
common law and under the Code. 60 American State Bank then
argued that section 3-419 displaced the common law for conversion
of negotiable instruments in North Dakota. 6t Great American
53. See U.C.C. S 4-207(1) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-04-17(l) (1983)] (warranties
customers and collecting banks make in the transfer and presentment of items); id. S 4-207(4) (1978)
[N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-04-17(4) (1983)] (person must bring warranty cause of action within
reasonable amount of time). For the text of S 4-207(l),(4), see supra notes 10, 12.
54. See id. § 4-207(4).
55. See, e.g., Home Indem. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 659 F.2d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 1981) (after
finding a number of instances of the payor's dilatory behavior, the court determined that a delay of
18 days by the payor was unreasonable when the depositary bank could have avoided the loss had it
been informed of the forgery); Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Davis, 126 N.J. Super. 379, __
, 314
A.2d 615, 622 (1974) (a 10 week delay after a party learned of the breach was unreasonable even
though certain records had been lost due to mergers and relocation of offices); First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Branch Banking& Trust Co., 282 N.C. 44, -,
191 S.E.2d 683, 692 (1972) (a reasonable
time for notification depends upon the circumstances ofeach case).
56. 385 N.W.2d 460, 464 (N.D. 1986).
57. Great Am. Ins. v. American State Bank, 385 N.W. 2d 460, 462 (N.D. 1986); see U.C.C. S
3- 419(1) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-03-56(1) (1983)] (conversion of instrument). For the text of
S 3-419(1), see supra note 16.
58. GreatAmerican, 385 N.W.2d at 462.
59. Id. American State Bank argued that because S 3-419(1) refers only to a forged indorsement
and not to a missing indorsement, the latter does not constitute conversion under the Code. Id.; see
U.C.C. S 3-419(1) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-03-56(1) (1983)] (conversion of instrument). For
the text of S 3-419(1), see supra note 16.
60. GreatAmerican, 385 N.W.2d at 462.
61. Id.; see U.C.C. 5 3-419(1) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-03-56(1)(1983)] (conversion of
instrument). American State Bank contended that pursuant to S 1-01-06 of the North Dakota
Century Code there is no common law in North Dakota when the law is declared by statute. Great

650

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63:641

countered that section 3-419 did not displace common-law
conversion, but instead supplemented it.62 The court agreed with
Great American and determined that the Uniform Commercial
Code permitted the principles of equity and the common law to
supplement the Code. 63 Therefore, a collecting bank could be liable
for conversion pursuant to the common law and the Code.6 4
The second issue the court addressed was whether payment of
a check over a missing indorsement constitutes conversion
pursuant to the Code. 65 The court perceived no legal difference
between payment on a forged indorsement and payment on no
indorsement. 66 Moreover, the court stated that the payment of an
instrument on a forged indorsement and payment on a missing
common-law
conversion. 6 7
indorsement
both constitute
Consequently, the court determined that a collecting bank may be
liable for conversion of a payable through draft when it pays the
draft over the missing indorsement of a copayee. 68
The court recognized that a collecting bank may limit its
liability pursuant to subsection 3-419(3) of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 69 Subsection 3-419(3) limits a collecting bank's
liability if the bank deals with the instrument according to
reasonable commercial standards. 70 The court agreed, however,
with the trial court's finding that American State Bank had not
acted in accordance with reasonable commercial standards in
American, 385 N.W.2d at 462; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-01-06 (1975). Section 1-01-06 provides: "In
this state there is no common law in any case where the law is declared by the code." Id.

62. Great American, 385 N.W.2d at 462. Great American argued that the Uniform Commercial
Code, rather than displacing the common law, was supplemented by it pursuant to § 1-103 of the
Code. Id.; seeU.C.C. S 1-103 (1978) [N.D. QENT. CODE § 41-01-03 (1983)] (general principles of law
and equity supplement the Code); id. S 3-419 [N.D.CENT. CODE S 41-03-56 (1983)] (conversion of

instrument). For the text of 5 1-103, see supra note 21.
63. Great American, 385 N.W.2d at 462. The court determined that the particular language of
1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code controls the broad language of § 1-01-06 of the North
Dakota Century Code. Id. Compare U.C.C. S 1-103 (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-01-03 (1983)]
(general principles of law and equity supplement the Code) with N.D. CENT. CODE 5 1-01-06 (1975)
(where the North Dakota Century Code declares the law it supplants the common law.
64. reat American, 385 N.W.2d at 462; cf Willow City v. Vogel, Vogel, Bratner & Kelly, 268
N.D.2d 762, 766-67 (N.D. 1978) (Uniform Commercial Code is not a comprehensive codification
and therefore the common law of assignment and debtor/creditor is still in effect in North Dakota).
65. GreatAmerican, 385 N.W.2d at 462.

66. Id. (quoting Humberto Decarators Inc. v. Plaza Nat'l Bank 180 N.J. Super. 170,
434
A.2d 618, 619 (1981)). For a discussion of Humberto and the issue ofwhether a missing indorsement is
analagous to a forged indorsement, see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
67. Great American, 385 N.W.2d at 462. The court reasoned that payment on either a forged
indorsement or on no indorsement constituted a wrongful exercise of dominion over another's
property. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 462-63; see U.C.C. S 3-419(3) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-03-56(3) (1983)]
(reasonable commercial standards defense). For a discussion of S 3-419(3), see supra notes 23-35 and

accompanying text.
70. See U.C.C. § 3-419(3) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-03-56(3) (1983)]. For the text of § 3419(3), see supra note 24.
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paying the draft over a missing indorsement. 7t Therefore, the court
concluded that subsection 3-419(3) of theUniform Commercial
Code did not exonerate American State Bank. 71
American State Bank also contended that its liability for
conversion should be limited pursuant to subsection 4-207(4) of the
Uniform Commercial Code. 73 Subsection 4-207(4) discharges a
collecting bank's liability for breach of presentment warranties to
the extent of any loss caused by a delay in making the claim. 7" The
court recognized that if Ford Credit had proceeded directly against
Great American for conversion, Great American could have sued
American State Bank for breach of good title. 75 American State
Bank could then have counterclaimed that its liability was
discharged pursuant to subsection 4-207(4) of the Uniform
Commercial Code to the extent of any loss caused by Great
American's delay in bringing the claim. 76 Moreover, if Ford Credit
had directly sued American State Bank for conversion and
recovered the proceeds of the draft, the court believed that
American State Bank would still have a valid claim pursuant to
subsection 4-207(4) against Great American for its delay in
learning of the forgery. 77 Therefore, although Great American, as
Ford Credit's assignee, brought an action against American State
Bank for conversion pursuant to subsection 3-419(1) and not an
action for breach of good title pursuant to subsection 4-207(,), the
court determined that the assignment did not preclude American
State Bank from asserting that its liability could be limited by
subsection 4-207(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code.7 8
71. Great American, 385 N.W.2d at 463. American State Bank accepted the joint payee payable
through draft from Welch without the indorsement of Ford Credit. Id. at 461. An employee for
American State Bank testified at trial that its acceptance of the draft without Ford Credit's
indorsement was not in accordance with reasonable commercial standards in the industry. Id. at 463.
72. Id.; see U.C.C. S 3-419(3) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-03-56(3) (1983)] (reasonable
commercial standards defense). American State Bank characterized its conduct in paying the draft
over a missing indorsement as a "mistake," implying that this was a reasonable commercial
standard. Great American, 385 N.W.2d at 463. However, the court, without any explanation, failed to
see any validity in the bank's argument. Id.
73. Great American, 385 N.W.2d at 464; see U.C.C. 5 4-207(4) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 4104-17(4) (1983)] (person must bring warranty cause of action within reasonable amount of time). For
a discussion of § 4-207(4), see supra notes 12, 53-55 and accompanying text.
74. See U.C.C. S 4-207(4) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41- 04-17(4) (1983)].
75. Great American, 385 N.W.2d at 464.
76. Id.; see U.C.C. § 4-207(4) (1978) [N.D. CENT CODE § 41-04-17(4) (1983)].
77. Great American, 385 N.W.2d at 464; see U.C.C. S 4-207(4) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 4104-17(4) (1983)].
78. Great American, 385 N.W.2d at 464-65. The court cited Sun n' Sand, Inc. v. United California
Bank as authority for its conclusion that a collecting bank may limit its liability for conversion
pursuant to 5 3-419(1) by the application of 4-207(4) of the Code. Id.; see Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United
Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 684, 582 P. 2d 920, 929, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 338 (1978) (a collecting
bank and payee may assert the same defenses as are available to drawee banks in an action brought
by a drawer against a drawee bank); U.C.C. § 3-419(1) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-03-56(1)
(1983)] (conversion of instrument); id. § 4-207(4) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-04-17(4) (1983)] (person
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Since American State Bank could use the "subsection 4-207(4)
defense" to limit its liability for conversion, the court had to
determine when Great American "learned of the breach" in order
to determine whether any loss was caused by Great American's
delay. 79The court noted that this was a special case of a payable
through draft in which Great American was both a. drawer and
drawee of the draft and a nonbank entity. 80 Moreover, the court
noted that in the usual check collection case a drawee bank that
pays an item over a missing indorsement is generally not obligated
to discover that forgery.8 1 Therefore, in the usual collection case
between a drawer and drawee, the drawee bank does not "learn of
82
the breach" when it pays a check over a missing indorsement.
The drawer-customer, however, has certain responsibilities
pursuant to subsection 4-406(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code
to make reasonable inspections of its bank statements and canceled
checks
for
unauthorized
signatures,
indorsements,
and
alterations. 83 Furthermore, the court in Great American noted that a
drawer-drawee insurance company rather than the collecting bank
is better able to detect a forged payee's signature on a payable
through draft by comparing the signature on the draft with the
insured's signature on the insurance application. 8 4
Consequently, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded
that, since a drawer-customer usually has a duty to check his or her
statement, and since Great American was both the drawer and
drawee and in the best position to check for the missing
indorsement, "logic and equity" commanded Great American to
have learned of the breach when it paid the draft on June 3, 1982.85
must bring warranty cause of action within a reasonable amount of time). For the text of S 3-419(1),
see supra note 16. For the text of 5 4-207(4), see supra note 12.
79. Great American, 385 N.W.2d at 465; see U.C.C. § 4-207(4) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 4104-17(4) (1983)]. For the text of § 4-207(4), see supra note 12. American State Bank contended that
the date when Great American's employee initialed the check, June 3, 1982, should be used as the
date when Great American learned of the breach, because Welch's account at American State Bank
had sufficient funds to cover the draft on this date. GreatA merican, 385 N.W.2d at 465.
80. GreatAnerican,385 N.W.2d at 465.
81. Id. For a discussion of the policy reasons why a drawee bank normally does not have the
burden to check for missing or forged indorsements, see supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see U.C.C. 5 4-406(1) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-04-33(1) (1983)] (customer's duty
to discover and report unauthorized signatures or alterations). For a discussion of § 4-406(1), see
supra notes 36-38.
84. Great American, 385 N.W.2d at 465; see also Murray, Drafts 'Payable Through' Banks, 77 COM.
L.J. 389, 390 (1972). Murray states that the historical reason why the collecting bank has the final
responsibility for a forged indorsement is because it is in the best position to discover a forged payee's
signature by requesting identification of the payee. Id. He adds, however, that if anyone is in a
position to detect forgeries in the payees signature, it is the drawer-drawee insurance company,
which is able to compare the payee-insured's signature on the draft with the insured's signature on
insurance application forms, claim forms, and letters, before it approves the draft. Id.
85. GreatAmerican,385 N.W.2d at 465- 66.
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Therefore, because the trial court had not determined what was a
reasonable time for Great American to present the claim after it
learned of the breach, the North Dakota Supreme Court remanded
86
the case.
In its decision in Great American, the North Dakota Supreme
Court created an equitable remedy for collecting banks to raise in a
conversion action. 87 The court allowed the estoppel defense of
subsection 4-207(4) to be asserted in an action for conversion
pursuant to subsection 3-419(1)(c) of the Uniform Commerical
88
Code.
Before Great American, a collecting bank was absolutely liable if
it mistakenly paid a draft over a forged indorsement and in so doing
was not in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. 89 A
payor bank could sit on its laurels after it learned of the forgery and
bring an action for conversion against the collecting bank at any
time within the confines of the statute of limitations imposed by
subsection 4-406(4) of the Code. 90 Furthermore, while the payor
bank delayed in presenting its claim, the forger could withdraw the
proceeds of the forged draft that were still in the possession of the
collecting bank. 91 These funds would no longer be available to the
collecting bank for it to offset against the loss when it subsequently
learned of the forgery. 92 Accordingly, Great American seems to fill a
void in the Code that had inflicted unjust hardships on collecting
banks.
BRIANJ. KLEIN

86. Id. at 466.
87. See id. at 464-65.
88. Id.; see U.C.C. 4-207(4) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-04-17(4) (1983)] (person must bring
warranty cause of action within reasonable amount of time); id. S 3-419(1)(c) [N.D. CENT. CODE S
41-03-56(1)(c) (1983)] (conversion of instrument). For the text of S 4-207(4), see supra note 12. For
the text of S 3-419(l)(c), see supra note 16.
89. See National Sur. Corp. v. Citizens State Bank, 41 Colo. App. 580, 582, 593 P.2d 362, 364
(1978), aff'd, 199 Colo. 497, 612 P.2d 70 (1980). In Citizens State Bank a corporation alleged that a
depositary bank converted several checks containing forged indorsements. Id. at 581, 593 P.2d at
363. An employee who had stolen the checks from the corporation presented them to the bank and
the bank cashed them. Id. at 581, 593 P.2d at 363. The Colorado Court of Appeals stated that a
ciaim for conversion is established when a depositary bank has paid a check on a forged indorsement.
Id. at 582, 593 P.2d at 364. Furthermore, the court stated that it is incumbent on the depositary bank
to plead and prove "good faith" and "commercial reasonableness" pursuant to S 3-419(3) of the
Uniform Commercial Code as an affirmative defense to a conversion allegation under the Code. Id.
at 582, 593 P.2d at 364; see U.C.C. S 3-419(3) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-03-56(3) (1983)]
(reasonable commercial standards defense). For the text of S 3-419(3), see supra note 24.
90. See U.C.C. § 4-406(4) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-04-33(4) (1983)] (statute of limitations
to discover and report unauthorized signatures and alterations). For the text of § 4-406(4), see supra
note 39.
91. See U.C.C. § 4-207(4) (1978) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41- 04-17(4) (1983)1 (person must bring
warranty cause of action within reas6nable amount of time). For a discussion of 5 4- 207(4), see supra
notes 12, 53-55 and accompanying text.
92. See id.

